The culture in Eilgayaq has a foundation with a Yugtun language. Majority of the population are fluent speakers in Yugtun. A school should be established with Yugtun langauge in the location where the language is strongly spoken. The elders of Eilgayaq have a unique ability to keep the language strong. Dr. Jerry Lipka deserves to have his name titled for the schools in Eilgayaq. Eilgayaq is in the Southwest region of Alaska.

Lipka, Mohatt, and The Ciulistet Group's book is an important contribution for educators interested in educational equity, access, and school/curriculum reform. The authors underscore cultural issues in education that are authentic, multifaceted, and critical. These are the very issues that must be considered if we are to meet the educational needs of all children. The heart of the book squarely challenges simplistic answers to complex educational "problems" by providing a a refreshing format to voices we rarely hear.

Having read several of the many books about the Gulf War, I have discovered that all of them contain (as you would expect) elements that are biased by the author's viewpoint. This book is no exception, exhibiting the bias of the reporter's perspective that the military/politicians un-necessarily restricted access by the public (ie the press corp). However, by a lot hard work in utilizing the extensive resources widely available after the conflict, it does overcome this bias and thereby provide the broadest and most complete overall description of the origins, political manuervering, military planning, and actual execution of the initial defensive and subsequent offensive phases of the war, of any account I have read. And it does so in a very interesting and informative manner.

I am especially impressed with the personalized style of the presentation of both the political and military events, and also with the excellent graphics and tactical/strategic analysis used to explain the overall context of those events. The combination of broad scope, professional graphics, and personal accounts of individual participants placed in the context of overall tactics/strategy really brings the "history to life".

This book has become my "baseline" for understanding / interpreting the other very good (and not so good) accounts of the war. It provides the timeline and outsider "truthline" of the events of the war from which to put into perspective, and base my own opinions of, the accounts of the war by the various individuals with a more personal stake in their presentation. I do not take the "facts" presented in this book as "absolute", but feel they probably contain less "self interest" than other accounts by other authors with "reputations" to foster or protect.

In that respect, this book has increased my "enjoyment" of the other books on the subject as I compare and contrast the "issues" of the war as described by each of the involved individuals who have a particular axe to grind concerning those issues: "a tactical versus a strategic air war campaign", "functional versus by service organization of the coalition forces", "who was responsible for establishing the 'left hook' strategy of the ground war", "did we start the ground war too soon and not give airpower a chance to 'win the war'", "was the progress of the VII Corps too slow ?", "was the progress of the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions too fast ?","who stopped the Khafji excursion (airpower, marines, or Saudis)", "did we learn and then utilize the right lessons from the Khafji fight", and - last but most importantly - the key question: "did we stop the war too soon and therefore fail to accomplish the goals established at the outset of the war ?"

Buy this book to get a very interesting, readable, and definitive overview of the Persian Gulf War. Then sit back and form your own opinions of both the big and little issues from the accounts by Schwarzkopf, Powell, Horner, Franks, Boomer, et al

(Bye the bye ... I find it fascinating that the same above issues (as they applied at the time) were hotly contested in accounts of the WWII Central Pacific and SW Pacific campaigns! Truly, if we do not learn from history, we are bound to repeat it. )

Triumph Without Victory is the best account and review of how the Gulf War happened. This book is filled with amazing details and facts that make it a true corner stone in the history of this War. From the international effort to restrict Iraqi weapons access to the planning room of Gen. Schwarzkopf, this book recordes what happened. Having been in the Gulf War I was truelly amazed at the amount and scope of information contained in this book. I read this book when it was first published and will never forget it. The true testament of this book is its recording of many of the important facts that some governments would like to forget. The authors obviously went to great lengths to research, corrolate, and record not only the most famous events but the small and possibly most important events. The secret effort to bomb Saddam Hussein, the US destroyed chemical weapons facility and its toxic cloud, and the CIA computer virus in the Iraqi radar system. The purpose of this book was to record history, it did just that and it did it well.

The introduction presents an outstanding overview of how the war came about, and is followed by the most complete bibliography of the conflict yet published.

Betty Pratt Johnston is a fantastic writer and gives you that edge on new dive sites. Her comprehensive style allows experienced and new divers alike to learn something new about every dive site listed. Betty covers items important to all levels of divers, including specialty divers like naturalists, UW Photographers, wreck etc...

A must have.

The shocking thing about this work is that it is publically available. It provides a remarkable look into the process and forces that are driving United States air operations (for good or ill) in the Joint arena. It should be required reading for every military aviator. Its only essential flaw is that it began as commissioned study, and its customer is obvious.

I bought this book as a result of a small argument with a friend during the last (2002) soft shell crab season in the Washington/Baltimore area; I knew that somehow the casting off the crab's hard shell by the female had some sort of reproductive significance, but I could not recall what it was, and I was soon downed in the argument when it was pointed out that both males and females shed their shells (true), and that they certainly did not mate in a state of shell-less nudity (also true.)

And so this little book clarified not only the mating ritual (the female mates only once in her life, in soft shell nakedness, and later perishes) but also the life cycle of these delicious critters, the catching of them, and their culinary preparation. It is a short little tract (less than 100 pages) but it is replete with facts that guarantee you'll never be downed in an argument about blue crabs. It gets a top rating because the book does not pretend to be anything it is not. Short, full of information, useful.

The authors provided a host of factual information and quotations, providing a vivid picture of the military conquest by theUS-led military forces in a short, quick read compact format. Theirfollow up book on the weapons that will be employed by the united states in its future wars against powerless 3rd world countries is cause for great concern.

Ten years after its publication, this slim volume stands up to the test of time. The essays, all written prior to the beginning of the Gulf War, soberly examine the rationales and likely outcomes of the then unfought conflict. Then-president Bush's "New World Order", the use of threats to the oil market as a rationale for the war, and long term problems in the mid-east are all critically dissected and little justification is found for military intervention.

Possibly the most interesting part of the book is the essays on the oil supply. A pro-war administration and its pundit allies in the press predicted sky high prices if America didn't strike against "naked aggression." An excellent case is made in "A War for Oil?" that no such thing would have occurred and the fact that oil prices have continued to decline over the past ten years, even with the restricted output and other disruptions in the oil supply, helps put the lie to such wild claims.

This book is an essential addition to the library of anyone interested in critiques of America's foreign policy and especially to those who are concerned with the tendency of the U.S. to intervene militarily abroad.

There was never much debate in the United States over why we're going to war against Iraq; administration rhetoric was always accepted at face value by critics and supporters alike. Still less were questions raised about why America is so deeply involved in the politics of the region. Most Americans probably aren't even aware of the depth of US ties to Middle Eastern dictators or the history of American interference in regional affairs.

This book, surveying US policy from 1948 to 1983, is the kind of reading we should all be doing to overcome these blind spots. As Stivers makes clear in a mere 125 pages of rigorously documented but concise history, American policy has frequently been dressed in the same rhetoric of nobility that our leaders are now using, but has always been motivated by the cold interests of power.

During the Cold War, American policymakers above all sought to maintain the status quo they inherited from their imperialist predecessors, what they called the "maintenance of the special political, military and economic interests comprising the Western position in the area". Doing so meant excluding external powers (the USSR) from the region, suppressing the growth of independent regional powers that might challenge American dominance (first Nasser's Egypt, then Khomeini's Iran), and maintaining access to oil "on reasonable terms".

Cheap oil was always what made the Middle East important to the US, because the continued operation of the global economic order would have been impossible without it. As Britain relinquished its power in the region, though, Western control over the region's resources came increasingly under nationalist attack by Middle Easterners who often looked to the Soviet Union for support in reducing US influence. Some American officials sought accommodation with these nationalist currents; others believed unbridled violence was a better option. But the goal of the nationalists - self-determination in political and economic affairs - was incompatible with America's desire to control the region's oil and its need for reliable allies who would guarantee that control. Thus even the most accommodationist administrations eventually turned to policies of repression and militarism to preserve their position in the region.

Though this study ends in the early Reagan administration, it's not hard to see that the US government's fundamental aims in the region have not changed: the US used Iraq to cripple Iranian power in the 1980s, then used the horrific sanctions to cripple Iraqi power in the 1990s, all while establishing permanent military positions in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states and continuing the flow of weapons and aid to those willing to obey its commands. The current administration, coming out of the tradition that sees violence as the most efficacious means of consolidating and expanding American power, will soon go to war for time-honored reasons: so that we can further control Middle Eastern oil, so that we can cement our position of hegemony in the region, and so that the inequities of the global economy can be protected.

This is becoming out of date (1980), yet it's still the best book I've seen on the modern political history of the Arabian Peninsula. The 500-plus pages cover such topics as the British departure from Aden (Yemen) and the Trucial Coast (now UAE), Oman's civil war in Dhufar, Saudi-UAE border disputes, OPEC in the 70s, and an overview of the current political situation in the various countries. Iran and Iraq also receive substantial coverage, but the greatest emphasis is on Saudi Arabia and the minor Gulf states. There are five maps. Although much has happened since the book was written -- namely the Gulf War -- this remains the classic introduction to the region's politics for the serious reader.